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ABSTRACT 
Steganography, or information hiding, is the study of methods to hide data within 
a medium. Handwritten communications, digital images, digital video and digital music 
are examples of various media in which data can be hidden. A primary application of 
steganography is the "watermarking" of digital information. Just as paper money, 
governmental documents, and even official school transcripts contain watermarks to 
prevent unauthorized reproduction, vendors seek to watermark their digital information to 
prevent piracy. 
Methods of steganography can also be used to create covert channels. A covert 
channel is a public medium used to transmit private information. Data can be embedded 
using a steganographic algorithm in order to transmit private information rather than 
authenticate ownership. Media such as image data, sound data or even the access times 
of a file, can be used as covert channels. 
Minimax algebra is known to have applications to machine scheduling, operations 
research, and image algebra. Raymond Cuninghame-Green provided the groundbreaking 
work in this area. Minimax algebra provides parallels to linear algebra by extending the 
real numbers and introducing new operations with amazing properties. Ritter and 
Sussner use minimax algebra as the mathematical foundation for a new image transform 
called the minimax eigenvalue decomposition (MED). This transform avoids 
computational difficulties encountered with other techniques used for image layering, 
compression and transmission. 
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This thesis presents research where properties of the MED transform are used to 
produce a flexible, computationally robust technique for hiding data within digital 
images. This new technique can be used to watermark an image or to convert an image 
into a covert channel. A measure is provided to determine how close an image 
containing message data is to the original image. Inherent in the technique are keys, or 
information separate from the message data stored in the image, that can establish 
authenticity of the image data, making this technique different from most steganography 
techniques that rely on embedded data integrity to establish authenticity. The technique 
is applied to ten different real images. An analysis of the results and ideas for future 
research are presented. 
1 
INTRODUCTION 
Throughout history, people have been concerned with the protection of 
information from unauthorized use or access. Information can be dangerous, or it can be 
helpful, depending on the intent of the user. The danger of unauthorized use or access, 
either real or perceived, has motivated people to find ways to protect or restrict either the 
distribution of information or the transaction of information from one place to another. 
However, methods of subverting restrictions and bypassing protections have emerged 
along with methods of protection and restriction. 
Steganography, cryptography, and covert channels are three techniques used both 
to protect information and to subvert restrictions on the transaction of information. 
Steganography, or "covered writing", is the art and science of hiding information within 
a medium that is not hidden. Examples of such media are digital image data, analog or 
digital sound data, and hand-written or typed text. When used to pass information, these 
media can be referred to as covert channels [1]. Digital watermarking [3], for instance, is 
an application of steganography where digital information is placed within data to allow 
an owner to verify its authenticity. Authentication [16], or the establishment of 
ownership of information by a party, is an important application of digital watermarking. 
The authenticity of information is established by either making the embedded 
information or the algorithm for inserting or removing the information unique to the 
owner. Sometimes the uniqueness of an algorithm is established through the existence of 
keys, which are specific pieces of information necessary to recover the hidden 
information that can be tied both to the owner of information and to the information 
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itself. Cryptography [16], on the other hand, is concerned with the creation and retrieval 
of scrambled infonnation. Protection from unauthorized access is dependent upon the 
strength of the algorithm used to scramble the infonnation. One use of cryptography is 
the creation and interpretation of digital signatures [16], or visible data created with the 
sole purpose of verifying the identity of a user and relating that user to a particular piece 
of infonnation, like a contract for instance. The difference between a digital signature 
and a digital watennark is a digital watennark is designed to protect the author of 
infonnation, whereas a signature is intended to protect the receiver of infonnation. The 
recipient of a document gains no advantage from the removal of a digital signature [9]. 
Steganography, cryptography, and covert channels have been used throughout 
history. In W orld War II, American prisoners of war would conceal infonnation from 
enemy censors by encoding a secret message in Morse code using the sequence of dots to 
the letter "i" and crosses to the letter "t" to communicate their message [15]. During the 
SALT II treaty talks between the United States and the U.S.S.R, an agreement was 
reached to place sensors on missile silos that would provide a count of the number of 
missiles each country had in their possession. However, the U.S. had a rotating missile 
system in their silos, used to shift the locations of their missiles, which they did not want 
revealed. Great concern was given to the analysis of those sensors for possible covert 
channels through which the U.S.S.R. could obtain infonnation regarding the locations of 
missiles [15]. Another example is found in ancient Greece, where messages were 
sometimes written on the shaved scalp of a messenger and the hair allowed to grow back 
[2]. Today, cable television signals are scrambled to allow access to paid subscribers 
with the right unscrambling equipment, and encrypted versions of passwords on 
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computer systems are stored instead of actual passwords to protect from hackers who 
may gain unauthorized access to the file. 
In recent times, methods have been developed for commercial use to protect 
information. One method of steganography for images breaks an image into rectangles of 
pixels, embedding a mark or information in particular rectangles that follow the detail of 
the image [7]. A method of steganography for sound spreads info across frequencies of 
music data and uses that information to identify the owner of a musical selection [6]. A 
method called Patchwork [2] takes advantage of statistical properties of an image by 
embedding an imperceptible, specific statistic (one that has a Gaussian distribution) 
within a digital image. Another method takes the frequency transfonn of an image, 
imbeds a watermark, and performs the inverse frequency transform to produce an image 
containing hidden data [3]. 
Researchers are searching for steganography techniques that can provide self-
authentication. Self-authentication is the ability of data to be authenticated without third 
party intervention. Np method of steganography has been found to provide self-
authentication. In other words, no method exists that cannot be rendered useless either by 
corrupting embedded data or by placing a second mark over an already embedded mark, 
making the first mark unreadable. These attacks are thwarted by the existence of third 
parties that can verify the previous existence of a mark. However, methods used by third 
party companies like Digimarc©, ARIS Technologies©, and MediaSec Technologies 
LLC© do not claim to be self-authentication methods, as no method has yet to be proven 
to be such. 
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Along with steganography and cryptography, covert channels and their analysis 
have found applications in computer systems. The Orange Book is a governmental 
publication that gives guidelines for evaluating the security of computer systems. In 
order for a system to be classified as an Al system, which is the highest classification 
level for any system, there must be a formal analysis of the potential for covert 
communications in the system. To see how easily covert communication can be 
achieved, we consider an example given in [10]. Suppose two people, High and Low, of 
different security levels, each have access to an interactive chess game. Furthermore, 
suppose that if Low plays by himself, the response time is Ims, an if Low plays with 
someone, the response time is 2ms. High can time when he plays with Low and when he 
doesn't, assuming that Low plays continually of course, to create a two letter alphabet 
through which he can communicate with Low. The first letter would be the 1 ms response 
time, and the second letter would be the 2ms response time. However, according to the 
*-property of the Bell-Lapadula security model [14], a person or entity ofa certain 
security clearance cannot communicate information to a person or an entity of a lower 
security clearance. Therefore, if this communication were allowed to take place, a breach 
in the security policy of the system would result. 
The type of channel discussed above is called a timing channel. Another type of 
channel is a storage channel. A storage channel is used to send information to a receiver, 
where the receiver samples data at certain time intervals or spatial locations agreed upon 
previously. The person receiving the communication doesn't necessarily know the 
message he or she will receive, but he or she knows the message has to be complete by 
the time the communication is complete. A stream cover is a storage channel where a 
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continuous data stream is used as a medium of communication [1]. Samples of the data 
are used to represent the message. Digital sound data, for example, can be used as a 
stream cover. A stream cover, however, cannot be used if the recipient wants to access 
the hidden data at will. A random access cover is a storage channel where the message 
can be accessed at will. An example of a random access cover is a frame on a Kodak 
Photo CD [18]. A frame's maximum resolution is 2048 by 3072 pixels, with each pixel 
containing 24 bits of information. By using only the least significant bit of each pixel to 
store a 0 or 1, a 2.3 megabyte message can be hidden in a single picture. 
This thesis focuses on hiding information within digital images. The method uses 
a radical image transform called the Minimax Eigenvalue Decomposition (MED), which 
decomposes an image into layers without the computational and roundoff penalties 
encountered in the Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) [12]. The SVD is well-
documented in matrix and image algebra literature, and is known to be computationally 
intensive due to the difficulty of computing eigenvalues and eigenvectors. The MED 
transform avoids these difficulties. This thesis utilizes the MED transform by combining 
message data and a subset of the layers produced by the transform to create an image that 
is "close" to the original image. The algorithm for the combining of the data and the 
selected layers yields keys useful for authenticating an image, even if the embedded data 
is tampered with. 
This algorithm is believed to be weak if an image is to be used as a covert 
channel. However, this algorithm is believed to be strong if one wants to prove 
ownership of an image. Because the keys produced by the algorithm are not dependent 
on the data stored by the algorithm, authentication can be accomplished even if the data is 
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tampered with, provided a trusted record of the keys exists. Although gray-value images 
are used in this thesis, the algorithm is based on a matrix transform, making it useful for 
any image converted into a matrix of pixel values, including color images. The amount 
of space available for storing a hidden message using this algorithm is dependent on the 
image used and the data stored. 
Chapter 1 focuses on definitions and mathematical preliminaries necessary to 
describe the MED transform and the steganography concepts. Chapter 2 contains the 
discussion of the transform and its comparison to the SVD method. Chapter 3 contains 
the proof that motivated the data-hiding algorithm as well as the data-hiding algorithm 
itself. Chapter 4 contains examples of images processed by the algorithm. Chapter 5 
contains an analysis and discussion of the results, and conclusions and ideas for future 
research with this algorithm conclude the thesis. 
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CHAPTER 1: PRELIMINARIES AND DEFINITIONS 
Minimax algebra serves as the mathematical foundation for this thesis, and [4] 
provides the groundbreaking work in the area. Initially applied towards job scheduling, 
this field of mathematics has been applied to the area of image algebra as well. 
Presented here are results from minimax algebra that are relevant to this thesis. Although 
the mathematics is not necessary to perform the algorithm, it is necessary for 
understanding how the algorithm works. This chapter contains a short presentation of 
definitions in steganography, and a brief introduction to minimax algebra. 
Authentication: 
Attack: 
Message data or Mark: 
Stego image: 
Key: 
Covert channel: 
1.1 Steganography terminology 
Establishment of ownership of information. Information is 
authenticated if it can be proven to have originated from a 
particular source. 
Any manipulation of a medium that seeks to either destroy 
the information stored in that medium or the ability to 
authenticate the medium. 
Data stored within or passed via a digital medium. An 
image is an example of such a medium. 
An image containing message data. 
Information used to either retrieve data from a stego image 
or to authenticate an image. 
A public medium used to communicate private information 
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between parties. Sound data, image data, or even chess games, as discussed in the 
Introduction, are examples of media used as covert channels. 
1.2 Minimax algebra: An introduction 
Minimax algebra is a matrix-structured algebra that manipulates matrices and 
vectors with algebraic operations that are similar to but distinct from regular linear 
algebra. The general idea of minimax algebra is as follows. Take the usual linear algebra 
operation of matrix-matrix multiply: 
n 
Cij = Laikbkj, 
k=l 
where A = {aij} and B = {bij} are appropriately sized matrices. Now, replace the 
multiplication operation with addition, and replace the sum operation with a maximum 
operation, to get 
n 
Cij = V (aik + bkj). (1) 
k=l 
This yields a matrix 
A 
C = {Cij} 
which is in general much different from C = {Cij}. The example given in Eq. (1) is a 
particular case that occurs in minimax algebra, and will be used in this thesis. This 
matrix algebra, when endowed with appropriate properties, produces a rich matrix 
structure which has continued concepts of eigenValues and eigenvectors, solutions to 
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systems of equations, matrix rank, spectral inequalities, and many other concepts parallel 
to those found in linear algebra. 
We shall give only a brief introduction to minimax algebra as concerns the 
concepts in this thesis, and refer the reader to [4], [11], and [12] for further details. 
A semigroup is defined as a set S with an operation EB such that the following two 
properties hold: 
G 1: x EB (y EB z) = (x EB y) ffi z V x, y, Z E S 
G2: x ffi y = y ffi x V x, YES 
provided, of course, that S is closed under ffi. 
(associativity) 
(commutativity) 
A semiring is defined as a semigroup (S,ffi) with an additional operation ® 
satisfying the following properties: 
Rl: x ® (y ® z) = (x ® y) ® z V x, y, Z E S 
R2: x ® (y ffi z) = (x ® y) ffi (x ® z) V x, y, Z E S 
~: (yffi~®x=(y®~ffi~®~V~~ZE~ 
(associativity of ®) 
(left distributivity of ®) 
(right distributivity of ®) 
Let Mm x n(S) be the set of m x n matrices whose entries are from S. The set 
Mm x n (S) with the operation ffi is a semi group as well, with ffi being defined in the 
following way: 
A ffi B = {cij} mxn, where cij = aij ffi bij, ViE {L.m },j E {L.n}. (2) 
(S, ®) may be a semigroup as well; in which case, (Mmxn (S), ®) is also a semigroup with 
® being defined by replacing ffi in Eq. (2) with ®. 
A matrix product ~ can also be defined in the following way: 
~: Mmxk(S) x Mkxn (S) ~ Mmxn (S), and A ~ = C, for A E Mmxk (S), 
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BE Mkxrn(S),andC E Mrnxn(S), where 
k 
Cij = r/=1 (ail $ bu) = (ail $ blj) ® ... ® (aik $ bkj). 
If S = R, $ = x, ®= +, we have matrix multiplication as in linear algebra: 
k 
Cij = L,=I ail x bu. 
Let us denote the set R u {-oo} as R-oo and the set R u {+oo} as R+a:>. Furthennore, let us 
define the operations +, +', v and A as follows: 
{
a+b, a,b E R 
a+b= 
- 00, a = -00 or b = -00 
, {a+b, a,b E R 
a+ b= 
+ 00, a = +00 or b = +00 
{
a, if a ~ b 
avb= 
b, otherwise. 
{
a, if a 5: b 
aAb= 
b, otherwise. 
Call a v b the max operation, and call a A b the min operation. 
If S = R-oo, $ = +, ® = v, then ~ 11 and the matrix product above takes the fonn: 
AGB = C, where 
k 
Cij = V/=I ail + bu = (ail + blj) v ... v (aik + bkj). 
We call this product a max product. 
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Similarly, if S = R+a>, e = +', ® = A, then ~ ~ and the matrix product above 
takes the form: 
AUB=C,where 
Cij = /\;=1 ail +' blj = (ail +' bl}) A ... A (aile +' bk}). 
We call this product a min product. 
Note: Boxes will be put around any special matrix operations, and will be left off of 
pointwise operations. 
Furthermore, define A- as the negative transpose of A. That is, if A = {aij}, then 
A* = {aij-} , where aij- = -aji. The negative transpose of A will be essential to calculating 
the MED transform ofA. 
Let us define pointwise image addition, subtraction, mUltiplication, max, and min 
of two images A = {aij} and B == {bij}as follows, reiterating the note above. 
A + B = C = {cij}, cij = aij + bij, 
A - B = C = {Cij} , cij = aij - bij, 
A * B =C= {Cij} , cij=aij * bij, 
A vB = C = {cij}, cij = aij v bij, 
A A B = C = {Cij} , cij = aij A bij. 
Finally, let us define the indicator threshold T of A and the indicator threshold 
image X~T(A) as follows: 
x ~ T(A) = C = {cij},cij = {~ if aij ~ T 
otherwise. 
These notations are used to describe the storage algorithm. 
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The semirings (L, v, +) and (R+oo, 1\, +') can be combined into what is known as 
the bounded lattice ordered group (BLDG) (R±oo, v, 1\, +, +'), where R±oo = R U {-oo, 
+oo}, and each operation is as defined above, resulting in a minimax algebra. 
BLOGs have rich and interesting properties with a wide variety of applications. 
This thesis does not come close to exploring the numerous applications of minimax 
algebra to the areas of scheduling theory and image algebra ([4], [5]). This thesis 
provides another contribution to the area and more attention to the area's potential. 
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CHAPTER 2: MINIMAX EIGENVALUE DECOMPOSITION (MED) 
Dividing an image into layers for transmission or storage purposes is not new. 
The singular value decomposition (SVD) is well known, and has been used for this when 
applicable. The SVD, however, has computational difficulties that cannot always be 
overcome if accuracy or computational efficiency is a concern. In [12] there is an 
alternative to those computational difficulties through the use of a radical, new transform: 
the minimax eigenvalue decomposition (MED). Much of the mathematical foundations 
for the MED can be found in [4], and discussions to image processing applications can be 
found in [5], [11], and [17]. 
A discussion of the MED transform is presented and compared to the SVD of a 
matrix. The discussion of the SVD is used first as an example of familiar material before 
we move into the unfamiliar territory of the MED. The MED discussion is a presentation 
of work done in [12]. 
2.1 The SVD transform 
The singular value decomposition (SVD) of A, a real-valued, m x n matrix (m~), 
provides a method for representing a matrix A as the product of three matrices as follows: 
A=UDV, U, V orthogonal m x m and n x n matrices, respectively, and 
dl 0 0 0 0 
0 d2 0 0 0 
D= 0 0 0 0 dn , 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
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where d} through dn are the square roots of the eigenvalues of the matrix AlA, or the 
singular values of A. Furthermore, these singular values are ordered such that 
The n columns of U, denoted u l , .,. , un, are the eigenvectors of AAI, and the column 
vectors Vi through Vo of V are the eigenvectors of AlA. 
The SVD has a well-known application to image compression and transmission. 
The matrix A can be written as 
,. 
A = Ld,Ui(Vi)" 
;=1 
where r represents the rank of D and (Vi)t denotes the transpose of the vector vi. Image 
compression can be achieved due to the fact that 
k 
A ~ Ld,Ui(Vi)' 
;=/ 
where k «r. This allows us to store or transmit only the set 
{ . .}k d;,u', v' ;=1 
if we want to represent the image with less data. 
2.2 The MED transform 
An element A. e R±a:> is a minimax eigenvalue of A with corresponding eigenvector 
ABx=A.+x. 
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Here, J... + x == (J... + XI, J... + X2, ••• ,J... + xm), where x = (XI, X2, .•• ,xm), and A e 
Now, the matrix U = A 6 A* has been proven [4] to have the property that each 
column of A is an eigenvector of U corresponding to eigenvalue O. In other words, UB a i 
= ai, where ai represents the i-th column of A, and hence UB A = A. 
The MED of an m x m matrix A can be written as 
A= UBDB V, 
where V=At , 
dl -00 -00 
-00 d2 -00 
D= 
-00 -00 dm 
and dl = d2 = .,. = dm = O. 
This transform avoids inaccuracies in eigenvalue computation since every 
eigenvalue is zero. 
Furthermore, we can represent A as a composition of the matrices ui B (Viy: 
m do i r:-:l( i)t m i r::l i t A = Vi=1 1+ u L:.J v = V i=1 u ~(v ) , 
where (Vi)t= ai, if ai represents the i-th row of A. Hence, the above equation changes to: 
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We call each u i B ai matrix a layer of A. Each u i B ai pair is an m x m matrix, and the 
pointwise max operation of all m layers is equivalent to the original m x m matrix A. 
These are analagous to the diUi(Vi)' elements in the SVD transform discussion. We shall 
call these elements layers as well. 
In the SVD transform, it is trivial to obtain the best approximating subset of k 
layers for a given k ~ n after the difficult task of obtaining the eigenvalues and 
eigenvectors has been accomplished. In the MED transform, there is no eigenvalue 
computation since they are all zero, and the U matrix computation is trivial. The 
determination of a set of the k best approximating layers for a given k, however, is not 
trivial. The measure that follows provides the basis for finding k best layers. Hence, the 
accuracy of reproduction is not a concern. The following algorithm is discussed in [12]. 
Define a measure s(A,B) as follows: 
s(A, B) = LLCij, where 
; j 
{
aij - bij, aij > bij, 
Cij = 0 otherwise. 
Now, for the ordering process, we have this algorithm: 
Ordering algorithm 
1) Find uj B aj = min(s(A, uj B aj), 1 ~ i ~ m). Name this pair u· and a •. 
2) Suppose you have found the first} (j;::: 1) eigenvector pairs. Now, find ucr and acr 
such that: 
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Rename this pair as uj +1 and aj+l. Furthermore, let us define Aj as follows: 
We callAj thejth reconstruction ofA. 
3) Set j = j + 1 and repeat steps 2 and 3 until j = m. 
In addition, it is straightforward to show that 
for eachj = 1, ... , m. This information is crucial in producing our stegoimage, as we will 
see in Chapter 3. The next example illustrates the process discussed above. 
2.3 Example 1: Layer computation 
Define a matrix A as follows: 
8 4 20 47 3 
6 56 48 0 8 
A= 27 88 13 97 65 . 
77 17 0 0 39 
53 17 47 67 0 
Then, we compute the U1Bal layer as follows: 
-8 -6 -27 -77 -53 
-4 -56 -88 -17 -17 
* A = -20 -48 -13 0 -47 , 
-47 0 -97 0 -67 
-3 -8 -65 -39 0 
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0 -52 -84 -69 -45 
-47 0 -97 -71 -67 
u= -7 -35 0 -50 -34 ,and 
-47 -48 -97 0 -67 
-3 -39 -71 -39 0 
0 8 4 20 47 
-47 -39 -43 -27 0 
u1Gal= -7 0(8 4 20 47 3)= 1 -3 13 40 
-47 -39 -43 -27 0 
-3 5 1 17 44 
Now, if we compute a115layers, and then compute the measure in step 1 of our algorithm 
above for each layer, we get these results: 
seA, U1Bal) = 917 
seA, U~2) = 1087 
seA, U~3) = 1102 
seA, Ut1a4) = 1287 
seA, u12Jas) = 952. 
Therefore, U1Bal would be our ucrlBacrl' or our AI. Proceeding on with step 2 of our 
algorithm, we find: 
S(U1Bah AI) = 0 
s(u~2,AI) = 393 
S(U11a3, AI) = 351 
3 
-44 
-4 . 
-44 
0 
S(Ut1a4, AI) = 402 
s(uBas, AI) = 199 
19 
A2 = (uO"I @aO"l)v (u0"2 @a0"2) = 
8 
6 
27 
77 
38 
4 
-43 
-3 
17 
1 
20 47 3 
-27 0 -32 
13 40 -4 
0 0 39 
17 44 0 
If we repeat this process 3 more times, we will find that As is indeed equivalent to our 
original matrix. 
Note that, for any ui B ai pair included in the Aj calculation, the s measure 
calculation between it and Aj must be zero. This is due to the fact that every element in Aj 
is greater than or equal to the corresponding element in the ui B ai matrix. Hence, since 
step 2 looks for the maximum measure between the ui B ai matrices and Aj for a particular 
n, duplication of layers found in this calculation is not a concern unless all the measure 
results equate to O. If all the measure calculations in step 2 equate to 0, we are done, 
understanding that this reconstruction is equivalent to the original matrix. 
Our focus will not be on simply reconstructing images. We want to store data 
within the reconstructions. The theorem discovered and proven in the next section 
provides a method to measure just how much space each reconstruction provides for data 
storage. 
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CHAPTER 3: PRODUCING A STEGOIMAGE 
We now present the algorithm for producing a stego image. First, a theorem is 
presented that provides the foundation for the algorithm. Then, a general storage 
algorithm is presented that stores the message data within the image, producing a stego 
image. 
3.1 Theorem 
This theorem is instrumental in providing the user with a way to determine which 
pixel locations in the image can be used to store message data. We will use this theorem 
to aid in defense against attacks as well. 
Theorem: Let A be an m x m matrix. Let Aj be the jth reconstruction of A. 
Then, Aj will contain at leastj rows of A. More specifically, ifthejth reconstruction of A 
IS 
rows tJ, t2, ... tj of A. 
In other words, we can track precisely where we have locations available for 
storage. Since Ai::;A (from Section 2.2), and we know that at least thej rows tl .... ,tj of Ai 
are exactly the same as the j rows tl .... ,tj of A, the remaining m-j rows of Ai potentially 
have individual pixel values that are less than or equal to A (since Ai::; A). It is in these 
m-j rows that the storage algorithm, presented in Section 3.3, will try to hide the message 
data. 
21 
Proof Let U={ uij },A={ aij}, andA*={ (a*)ij}. Then, because 
U=A 6A*, uij = min{ a;k + (a*)kj. 1 ~ k ~ m}, where (a*}Ig is the element in the kth row 
andjth column of A*. Now, Ujj = min{ a;k + (a*)ki' 1 ~ k ~ m}. But (a*)k; = - a;k. 
Therefore, Ujj = 0 for all i between 1 and m. Now, let Uk B ak = {(bk) ij}. This means that 
(bk) ij = U;k + akj for all i,j, k between 1 and m. Now, the kth row of Uk B ak contains the 
elements (bk) kj = Ukk + akj, 1 ~ j ~ m. But, since Ukk = 0 for all k, (bk) kj = akj for all j. This 
means that the kth row of uk B ak is equivalent to the kth row of A. Now, the element 
contained in the kth row and jth column in un Ban, n *" k, is (bn) kj = Ukn + anj. This means 
that (bn) kj = ak;y + (a*)vn + anj for some v corresponding to that element. Ifwe can show 
that (bn) kj ~ akj for any j, we can show that the kth row of un B an is, per element, always 
less than or equal to the kth row of Uk B ak. This is trivial, seeing as ak;y + (a *)vn + anj ~ akj 
+ (a*)jn + anj ~ akj for any j due to the 6 operation. This means that, if you perform the 
operation (Uk B ak) v (Un B an), both the kth and nth rows of this matrix will be 
equivalent to the kth and nth rows of A, since (bk) kj = akj V j from above. Furthermore, 
no other elements in this matrix will be greater than the corresponding element in A 
because no other elements in either Uk B ak or Un B an are greater than the corresponding 
elements in A. Since this argument can be extended to any max sum of the form 
(utI B all) v (ut2 B a t2) v ... V (utn B atn), 
where it can be shown that this sum will produce a matrix that contains at least rows t), t2, 
... tn of A, we have successfully proven our theorem. 
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We saw in Example 1 that A2 contained rows 1 and 4 of A. In that example, A2 
contained only those rows of A because the layers used to create A2 only contained those 
rows of A. However, if we look at the next example, we find a different result. This 
means that it is possible to have more rows of A included in the reconstruction than the tt, 
... to rows from utI B atI' ... uto B a to' This information is important to us. The more 
rows included from A, the less space there is to store data according to the algorithm that 
follows. 
3.2 Example 2: All rows included in all layers 
1 2 3 4 5 
6 7 8 9 10 
LetA = 11 12 13 14 15 . Then, 
16 17 18 19 20 
21 22 23 24 25 
-1 -6 -11 -16 -21 
-2 -7 -12 -17 -22 
A*= 
-3 -8 -13 -18 -23 ,and 
-4 -9 -14 -19 -24 
-5 -10 -15 -20 '-25 
0 -5 -10 -15 -20 
5 0 -5 -10 -15 
u= 10 5 0 -5 -10. 
15 10 5 0 -5 
20 15 10 5 0 
23 
But this means that: 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
5 6 7 8 9 10 
u
l [YJal = 10 E1(1 2 3 4 5)= 11 12 13 14 15 =A! 
15 16 17 18 19 20 
20 21 22 23 24 25 
The same is true for all the layers Uk [YJ ak, k E { 1 ... 5} . 
An explanation of this peculiar example can be found in [17], where rank of a matrix is 
defined. The rank of A above is 1, and thus any pair Uk B ak, k E {I, ... ,5}, will satisfy 
ukB ak =A. 
3.3 Storing message data within an image file 
This section describes the storage algorithm for hiding data within an image 
reconstruction Aj • The particular storage algorithm we use traverses the set of appropriate 
rows in a raster-scan order to hide the data, that is, in a left-to-right order in the row, rows 
top to bottom in the image. The presentation of the general algorithm assumes a raster-
scan order of traversal. However, any order of traversal is possible as long as the order 
can be recreated, so that the message data can be extracted properly. 
We simulated message data by producing a string of Os and 1 s that was generated 
uniformly and randomly using the randO function in C. This string simulates a well-
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encrypted message that we may want to hide in an image. From cryptology, we know 
that encrypting an original message into one that has a uniform distribution of symbols 
makes it more difficult to decrypt the scrambled message. We assume that the message 
to be stored in the image is encrypted in such a manner because it provides an additional 
layer of security against possible attacks on the stego image. 
This storage algorithm reads bits from a data file and adds them using integer 
addition to the pixel values at certain locations in the reconstruction image Aj , thereby 
creating a new image that hopefully is close to the original. This new image is the stego 
image. The pixel locations are chosen from certain rows of the images selected in the 
storage algorithm as described below. We also describe a measure that we use to 
evaluate how close the stego image is to the original image. 
The main idea of the storage algorithm is to place pieces of the message data at 
these pixel locations in Aj where Aj is strictly less than the original image A. Recall that 
Aj ~ A pointwise, although it is possible that Aj = A; see Example 2 in Section 3.2. By the 
theorem in Section 3.1, we know that the reconstructed image Aj will have at least j rows 
in it that are exactly equal to the correspondingj rows in the original image A. It is in the 
remaining m-j rows that Aj may be strictly less than A, and the storage algorithm searches 
those m-j rows. 
In the description of the storage algorithm, we let rI, r2, ... rm-j label the m-j row 
numbers of A that are not used in the reconstructed image Aj • Denote an element in row 
rn and column k of Aj by (aj)r~, and denote an element in in row rn and column k of A by 
ar~. Then by the Theorem, it is possible that (aj)r~ is strictly less than ar~. 
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Storage algorithm 
1) Take an image A and compute Aj for some j. 
2) Compute the image 
The indicator threshold is T = 0, and thus the image A/ = {(aj +)hk} "zeroes out" 
the negative values in Aj • 
3) Next compute the image 
B=A -A/. 
Thus, B = {bhk}, where 
{
ahk - (aj)hk 
bhk = 
ahk 
4) Compute the image C == {Chk}, where 
if (aj)hk ~ 0 
if (aj)hk < o. 
Chk = number of bits needed to represent bhk. 
Note that if A has 255 gray values, then 0 ~ Chk ~ 8 for all h and k. 
5) Let D == C * X~o(C - 1). Thus D = {dhk} satisfies 
{
Chk -1 
dhk= 
o 
if chk ~ 1 
if chk = o. 
The image D represents the number of bits from the message datafile that will be 
stored in the corresponding pixel location in the image A/. We have chosen to 
store one fewer bit per location than the maximum possible, for reasons discussed 
below. Thus, for example, if doo = 5, then 5 bits from the message datafile will be 
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stored (by integer addition) at location (0,0) in A/. From the Theorem, we know 
that nonzero values in D can only exist in rows r), r2, ... rm-j of D. 
6) Using a raster-scan order, we start at row r., and we fmd the first entry dr1k where 
dr1k ~ 1. Then, the first dr1k bits are pulled off of the message datafile, and we 
compute 
where Pr1k is the base-l0 representation of the first dr1k bits in the image file. The 
image As = {(as)hk} is the stego image. Then, the next entry dr1m where dr1m ~ 1 is 
found, and the next dr1m bits are pulled off of the message datafile, translated into 
a base-l 0 representation, and added to (aj +)r 1m• This process is repeated for all the 
entries in all of the rows r), r2, .. , rm-j of D and A/, until either the entire message 
datafile is stored, or we have traversed all available locations in the m-j rows for 
storage. If we run out of data, or if drnk = 0 for some n e {I ... m-j}, k e { 1 .. _m}, 
then 
That is, the steo image takes on the values of the original image at those particular 
locations. 
{
(as)rgk, 
(as)hk = 
ahk 
We call As the stego image. 
if h=rg,ge{I,2,m-j} 
otherwise. 
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Figure 3.1 gives a pictorial overview of the storage algorithm. We chose to store 
one less bit of information per appropriate pixel location than the maximum possible to 
avoid having to re-scale the stego image As after the procedure was completed. For 
example, if ahk = 250, and (aj +)hk = 230, then bhk = 250 - 230 = 20, and Chk = 5, since it 
takes 5 binary bits to store the decimal number 20. We could then chose to store the next 
5 bits from our message file at location (h,k) of A/. However, if the next 5 bits that were 
available in the message file were 111002 (the number 28 in base 10), then (as)hk = 230 + 
28 = 258> 255. Since we are representing As by 8 bits only, we would have to re-scale 
As to ensure that pixel values fall within this range. Re-scaling could also change the 
visual appearance of As significantly. Reducing the number of bits stored by one avoids 
this situation. Since we want to make As visually close to A and preserve data integrity, 
we want to avoid re-scaling. 
~ L-6 bits .................. I 
""1---
ark 
n 
6 - 1 = 5 bits 
.. 01l0ij 011101 00101011. .. 
TOW Tn ~ 
column k 
Figure 3.1. Picture of storage algorithm. 
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We work with A/ instead of Aj to avoid re-scaling as well. If, for example, ahk = 31, and 
(aj)hk = -31, then ahk - (aj)hk = 62 = 1111102• This would mean that dhk = 6 - 1 = 5. The 
next 5 bits from the datafile could range from the decimal values 0 to 31. However, this 
would mean that (as)hk could only range from -31 + 0 = -31 to -31 + 31 = 0, in which 
case it is most probable that (as)hk would contain a negative value to re-scale. 
We also remark that a different order of visiting the sites marked for storage 
besides a raster-scan (corresponding to nonzero locations in D) will result in a different 
stego image As. 
We define a measure between two images A and F as follows: 
m-j m 
'" -I "'k_Iarnk-(!)rnk 
m(A, F) = £.In- £.J - • 
(m- j)xm 
Here, Fis an image oftypeAj (reconstruction) or As (stego). This measures the average 
difference per location used for storage between the original image and the image F. 
This is one measure we will use to determine how "close" our stego image is to our 
original image. The measure takes the differences between the image F and the original 
image at each matrix location, sums them, and divides the sum by the total number of 
elements in all valid rows. The closer the measure is to 0, the closer the image F is to our 
original image. Next we look at A and A2 from Example 1. 
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3.4 Example 3: Storage algorithm applied to an image 
8 4 20 47 3 8 4 20 47 3 
6 56 48 0 8 6 -43 -27 0 -32 
A= 27 88 13 97 65 Az= 27 -3 13 40 -4 
77 17 0 0 39 77 17 0 0 39 
53 17 47 67 0 38 1 17 44 0 
8 4 20 47 3 0 0 0 0 0 
6 0 0 0 0 0 56 48 0 8 
A; = 27 0 13 40 0 B= 0 88 0 57 65 
77 17 0 0 39 0 0 0 0 0 
38 1 17 44 0 15 16 30 23 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 6 6 0 4 0 5 5 0 3 
c= 0 7 0 6 7 D= 0 6 0 5 6 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
4 5 5 5 0 3 4 4 4 0 
8 4 20 47 3 
6 o + 5 data bits 0+5 data bits 0 0+3 data bits 
As= 27 0+ 6 data bits 13 40 + 5 data bits 0+6data bits. 
77 17 0 0 39 
38 + 3 data bits 1 + 4 data bits 17 + 4 data bits 44 + 4 data bits 0 
The three rows available for storing message data are r} = 2, r2 = 3, and r3 = 5. Using a 
raster-scan visiting order, the first valid location to check for possible storage of data is 
the (1,1) location of A2, as d)) = 5. We would then read off5 bits from our datafile, and 
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add the base 10 representation of those bits to (a/)lI to create (as)ll. We would follow 
similar procedures to find (as)l2, (as)14, (as)2I. (as)23, (as)24, (as)so, (as)SI. (as)s2, and (as)S3, 
until we either run out of bits to read or each of these locations has been visited. Ifwe 
run out of bits, we fill the remaining pixel locations with the original image pixel values 
at those locations. 
3.5 Extracting data from the stego image 
Here we give a short description on how to recover data from a stego image. 
In brief, the process above is inverted. The receiver of As will need to know A and 
the reconstruction value j, as well as the traversal order followed when the message data 
was originally inserted into A/. The receiver computesA/, knowing A andj, and 
computes the image D, following the procedure outlined in Section 3.3. Then the 
receiver pulls off the number of bits dhk from each location (h,k) at the corresponding 
locations in As. Thus, for each (h,k) where dhk'¢ 0, the value (as)hk - (aj +)hk is computed, 
and (as)hk - (aj +)hk will be represented by dhk bits. The bits are pulled off in the traversal 
order used to insert them, and the message data file consists of the bit string created by 
stringing those bits together in that order. Then decrypting of the message is performed if 
needed. 
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 
In this chapter we present the results of applying the storage algorithm given in 
Chapter 3 to ten different images. The images were obtained from web sites, and a wide 
variety of images were selected. We chose to set j = 125 for each of the seven images, 
although the (square) image sizes varied from 149 x 149 to 326 x 326. We chosej = 125 
arbitrarily. The space available to hide data increases as j decreases. However, the 
smaller the value for j, the higher the possibility for error as less of the original image 
will be included within the reconstruction image Aj • The size of each image, the level of 
reconstruction, the number of locations available for storage, the difference measure base 
10, the difference measure in bits, and the average LJ error over the storage locations are 
included for each image in Table 4.1. The average LJ error is computed over the number 
of storage locations only (not over (m-j) * m locations). The difference measure in the 5th 
column provides a value representing the average difference between the stego image and 
the original image per pixel location used to store message data. Figures 4.1 to 4.10 
contain images to which the algorithm was applied. Each figure can be found in [19]. 
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Table 4.1: Image information 
Images Size J # stor. # bits #bitsl Diff. Diff. LJ error 
Ictns. stored Ictn. meas. Meas. over 
(bits) storage 
Ictn. 
Figure 4.1 149 x 149 125 2395 9481 3.96 5.78 2.53 8.63 
Figure 4.2 150 x 150 125 2750 11911 4.33 8.43 3.07 11.49 
Figure 4.3 165 x 165 125 4711 14982 3.18 3.96 1.98 5.54 
Figure 4.4 169 x 169 125 5014 15314 3.05 3.49 1.80 5.17 
Figure 4.5 171x171 125 5805 19063 3.28 4.04 2.01 5.47 
Figure 4.6 178 x 178 125 1749 2297 1.31 0.228 -2.13 1.22 
Figure 4.7 195 x 195 125 9902 39828 4.02 10.8 3.43 14.89 
Figure 4.8 215x215 125 11556 37461 3.24 3.59 1.84 6.01 
Figure 4.9 263 x 263 125 28762 107686 3.74 7.30 2.86 9.21 
Figure 4.10 326 x 326 125 58073 230084 3.96 9 .02 3.17 10.18 
a. Original image. b. Stego image. 
Figure 4.1. Basketball player 1. 
a. Original image. b. Stego image. 
Figure 4.2. Basketball player 2. 
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a. Original image. h. Stego image. 
Figure 4.3. Old man in shack. 
a. Original image. h. Stego image. 
Figure 4.4. Room with people. 
~.;~ · l·t', ,... " ',' f ~. '1:' .•. · .. .. l4 ... ·.!.~.i '~ ..  •.•. . :.i,:J. ,· '. ~'.' ...•.. ""c.,'. - '-. , ;;' .. 'ie.
~ . ' 1 -...;.,. . 
.-" i,.J.~. '; .' . • 3 .. ".' ..... ". '~ ........  r ··t,.-'" 1'--... ,'- ~ . ,=a !' F 
r-~~ J 
a. Original image. h. Stego image. 
Figure 4.5. T ekken 3 logo. 
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a. Original image. h. Stego image. 
Figure 4.6. Beach. 
a. Original image. h. Stego image. 
Figure 4.7. Group picture. 
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a. Original image. h. Stego image. 
Figure 4.8. Butterfly. 
a. Original image. h. Stego image. 
Figure 4.9. Basketball player. 
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a. Original image. 
h. Stego image. 
Figure 4.10. Star Wars©. 
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CHAPTER 5: ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
The algorithm was run on a networked SGI workstation running IRIX. The 
algorithm took approximately 1.5-2 wall-clock hours for the 326 x 326 image in Figure 
4.7. Looking at Figures 4.1 and 4.2, we see that the stego images appear visually close to 
the original images on first glance, despite their high difference measure values of 5.78 
and 8.43. Indeed, the stego images almost look identical to the original images from a 
distance. A closer look reveals streakiness on the left side of Figure 4.1 b and in the 
crowd of people above the left shoulder of the man in Figure 4.2b. A closer look at 
Figure 4.2b also reveals that much of the streakiness that exists in the image is masked by 
the large gray-level variations in the region of the image representing the crowd. 
The stego images produced in Figures 4.3b and 4.4b are virtually 
indistinguishable from their original images. This is especially true in Figure 4.3b. 
Because the two images contain few light areas, differences between the stego and 
original images are difficult to see. 
The stego images produced in Figures 4.5b and 4.6b are also extremely close 
visually to their original images. Streakiness can be seen within the "3" in Figure 4.5b, 
but no difference is visually perceptible in Figure 4.6b. Furthermore, the streakiness seen 
in Figure 4.5b would likely go unnoticed by the casual observer. 
The streakiness in the stego images in Figures 4.7b, 4.8b, 4.9b and 4.1 Ob is more 
apparent. Each stego image has a high difference measure (7.84, 7.31, and 9.02 
respectively). In these stego images, the size of the image is important as compared to 
the level of reconstruction used G= 125). The larger the stego image, the more apparent 
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the streakiness. This is to be expected, due to the fact that a lower percentage of rows 
from the original images are being included in the larger stego images. For example, in 
Figure 4.10,326 - 125 = 201. Thus, there are 201 rows where message data can 
potentially be stored. In Figure 4.1, there are only 24 such rows. 
One idea for future analysis is to compare the average LI measure to the 
difference measure. There may be properties of the wayan image "looks" to the eye that 
can be determined through comparison of these two measures. 
An interesting result of our storage algorithm is the evenness in average bits per 
location stored in each image. Almost every image averaged between 3 and 4 bits of 
message data per storage location. This measure of bits per storage location could be a 
useful measure for future exploration of the algorithm. There does not appear to be any 
correlation, however, between the value of the average number of bits stored per image 
location and the value of the corresponding difference measure. 
We believe the storage algorithm in Chapter 3 to be useful for authentication 
purposes. Using this algorithm, there are three keys needed to authenticate a stego 
image: 1) the original image, 2) the level ofreconstructionj, and 3) the order in which the 
data was placed within the image (raster-scan, raster-scan on a rotation, etc). Without the 
original image and the level of reconstruction used to store data, it would be very difficult 
for an attacker to claim the image as their own. Even if another mark was embedded 
within the image via some other technique, it could be proven that the stego image was 
altered. Since we know which rows of the original image are included intact within any 
particular reconstruction and which ones are not, and since we know what was stored 
within a reconstruction, we have two pieces of evidence to validate our ownership of an 
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image. Unfortunately, this technique may not work as well as a standalone technique. 
Some trusted third party that could record the level of reconstruction and the original 
images would be necessary. 
Another way this technique could be used is as an authentication tool between 
two parties. If a person intercepted an image being used for communication between two 
people and compromised it, proving that the image was compromised would not be a 
difficult task. Because an attacker would not know the level of reconstruction used in the 
storage of the message data, he or she would have to attack the stego image as a whole. 
However, if a recipient knows the original image and the level of reconstruction, he or 
she can check to make sure that rows that should be included from the original image in a 
particular level of reconstruction are identically reproduced in the stego image. If they 
are not, one can suspect an outside influence. Again, having the original image and 
having the level of reconstruction provide strong authentication tools for any two people 
trying to communicate. 
One could even store multiple copies of one mark within an image at different 
valid locations. Suppose, for instance, an attack was initiated where the least significant 
bits of an image were randomly rearranged. A person can not only show that the image 
was altered, but may be able to recover the original data stored. Several copies of the 
mark would exist within the stego image that could be compared against one another. 
The copies of the mark could be stored at well-chosen locations, where at most one or 
two of the copies could be affected by such an attack, for instance. Enough copies could 
be embedded to prevent against the majority of those copies being affected by such an 
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attack. Hopefully, this method could be used to correct any errors that might have been 
introduced. 
There is the issue of the "streakiness", or visible appearance of horizontal streaks 
in an image, that can be introduced using this technique. This happens because the rows 
of the original image are included row by row into the reconstruction, and also because 
the values of the stego image are, pointwise, less than the original image values, resulting 
in "darker" (lower) values relative to "lighter" (higher) values surrounding them. Hence, 
the differences between the stego image and the original image also occur row by row, 
resulting in horizontal streakiness in the stego image that can be seen by the eye. 
However, one way to solve that may be to use a different storage algorithm. The data 
being stored may have an effect on how streaky an image looks. If you change the 
storage algorithm, you may be able to eliminate much of the streakiness. For example, 
using a storage algorithm that alternates between rows and columns might overcome this 
disadvantage. 
The neat thing about this algorithm is that an attacker doesn't necessarily know 
where the mark is stored within the image. You can pad the reconstruction with original 
image values in most of its locations except a few, storing your mark or multiple copies 
of your mark in these locations. Again, having the level of reconstruction and the 
original image would be important, since they tell you where you need to look for the 
mark or marks. 
As a covert channel, this technique is not as robust, as a message can be 
compromised in much of the same ways as a message can be compromised if stored 
using any other technique. However, as a method of authentication, we believe that this 
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method can be very strong. It provides two levels of authentication that are difficult to 
get around: the fact that the original image exists and the level of reconstruction. 
Unfortunately, if someone had the original image, they could run a brute force attack to 
find which level the stegoimage was reconstructed to. However, this does not mean that 
they will be able to access the mark, because they don't know the storage algorithm used 
to hide the mark or marks. 
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CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
What can this algorithm be used for? Where can this algorithm be applied? Can 
this algorithm be improved upon? Are there characteristics of the algorithm that have not 
been explored yet? 
One potential use for this algorithm could be the transformation of images into 
covert channels. Many countries have limits on the use of cryptography, but web pages 
are widespread. One party could maintain a web page where he or she posts stego 
images, the original images coming from different locations. If the intended recipient of 
a message knows the locations of the original images and the level of reconstruction used 
for each image, he or she could read messages posted on a web page in Denmark from his 
or her PC in Alaska. Messages could be transmitted across the world. 
Potential exists for using techniques from image processing, such as smoothening 
algorithms, to lessen the streaky effects seen in the stego images. Given the streakiness 
produced by the algorithm, the use of the algorithm alone as a watermarking technique 
may not be effective for some images. This could be due to the irregularities in an image, 
how bright or dark an image looks to the eye, or other characteristics of an image that 
may make our algorithm ineffective on that image. However, with digital smoothing 
techniques, some of the streakiness may be eliminated. There may exist a technique that 
could be applied to a stego image to reduce the streakiness and at the same time preserve 
the image quality. The only restriction on the technique would be that it would have to 
be a technique that was invertible. A non-invertible technique would jeopardize the 
ability to recover stored information from the stego image. An invertible smoothing 
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technique along with the algorithm may produce images that are closer to the original 
images. 
An interesting question arises regarding the inclusion of layers in particular 
reconstructions. Can an image be analyzed prior to execution of the reconstruction 
algorithm to predict which layers will be included in a particular reconstruction and 
which won't? Suppose we could run an image through another algorithm to predict 
which layers would be included and in which order. We could then predict where 
streakiness would occur by looking at the rows that would not be included in a 
reconstruction. An image may not be useful as a covert channel if, for instance, 
streakiness would occur in consecutive rows, as such streakiness might be visually 
apparent within a stego image. 
Another question arises from the discussion above. If we can predict which rows 
will be included within a reconstruction, can we construct images so that we know which 
layers will be included in which reconstruction before the layers are even computed? 
Can we compose images that include only the rows we choose? Instead of tailoring our 
message data to an image, we could then tailor an image to our message data. We could 
compose images that work best for the data we wish to hide. Is it even possible to 
manipulate an image that already exists by manipulating pixel values, for instance, to 
rearrange the order oflayers included in a particular reconstruction? We could then take 
images off of the web, adjust the image before running the algorithm, and produce the 
best stego image for a particular reconstruction. 
Still another, even more powerful application could come from the ability to 
compose images that included only the layers we choose. We could compose images in 
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which we would not even have to hide data, but instead use the order of inclusion of rows 
in a reconstruction to transmit an image. Suppose our message could be translated into a 
decimal string, like 2 4 67 98 3 for instance. If we could compose an image that included 
these layers as the fIrst 5 layers of the image, we could pass our message through the 
reconstruction instead of creating a stego image. We could simply post the image and tell 
an intended recipient the level of reconstruction to examine in order to retrieve the entire 
message. The message could be an encrypted message as well. We could then use the 
encryption algorithm as an additional key. 
The major weakness of this algorithm is the streakiness produced in the stego 
images. The streakiness is inherent in the algorithm, as the algorithm produces 
reconstructions that get closer to the original image row by row as you compute higher 
and higher levels of reconstruction. The storage algorithm always hides one bit less of 
data per location than what is predicted by the C matrix. A better storage algorithm could 
reduce the streakiness produced. Another weakness of the algorithm is its image 
dependence. The idea of rank is discussed in [17], which provides a method of predicting 
what level of reconstruction will produce the original image. We saw from our results 
that different images contain different amounts of space for storage. This could be a 
strength of our algorithm, however, as more properties of the algorithm are proven. 
However, since certain desirable properties have not been proven to exist yet, we must 
assume that the image dependence is a weakness. 
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